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Abstract 
Competence fields are conceptualised as an alternative to the median-voter approach to the relationship 
between political leaders and constituencies. The notion of competence fields assumes that prospective 
political leaders need be regarded as competent in order to convince constituencies of their leadership 
abilities. It is argued that competence is a constructivist concept – political actors invoke claims of 
competence, backed by more or less strong, contextually dependent reasons in speech acts, by means of 
which they attempt to convince the audience of their leadership abilities. It is also argued that the 
construction of competence becomes particularly problematic in times of crisis, when pressures from the 
social context onto the prospective leaders make their claims of competence generally less convincing. 
Leaders are then expected to resort to all sorts of rhetorical devices and draw public attention to those 
competence fields in which minimal costs are to be incurred in order to establish themselves as competent in 
front of the constituencies. An example of an agent-based model of ethnicity as one such competence field is 
provided. It is argued that competence fields can be further investigated by a combination of traditional 
social-scientific methods and various methods and techniques from the fields of information retrieval and 
computer modelling, which can be particularly helpful in providing empirical evidence of competence fields. 
 
Keywords: competence fields, political leadership, public perception, social construction, speech acts 
 
                                                     
1The ordering of the authors follows alphabetical order and does not indicate any priorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Problems of political leadership have recently not only arisen considerable scientific interest, but also found 
their way into the European Commission’s research priorities (European Commission, 2013). The roles of 
political leadership in recognising, acknowledging, facing, and overcoming the current deep social and 
economic crisis in Europe have already been, and are yet to become, subjected to critical scrutiny, and the 
ways how political leaders diagnose problems, prescribe solutions, and mobilize followers should be 
analysed (European Commission, 2013, p. 15).  
This work focuses on the relationship between leaders and followers, or, in our terminology, 
between leaders and constituencies.2 We are particularly interested in discursive procedures through which 
leaders secure electoral support of the constituencies.  
We largely discard the traditional median-voter approach to the relationship between political 
leaders and constituencies in favour of a more dynamic approach, bringing into the centre of analytical 
attention the so-called competence fields. Instead of passively mirroring the preferences of the median 
voter, we see leaders as active communicative agents, whose speech acts are primarily directed toward 
convincing the constituencies of their leadership abilities. 
Such discursive construction of competence becomes, however, particularly problematic in times of 
crisis. As Mastropaolo (2012, p. 217) notes: “Post-modern politics credits itself with being managerial and 
problem-solving, but this reputation is not particularly easy-to-wear”. It is particularly difficult, for example, 
for the leaders of a country on the verge of bankruptcy to submit convincing proofs of their competence. 
Hence we argue that in times of crisis leaders will resort to various rhetorical maneuvers in attempts to 
compensate for this structural deficiency. They will also try to shift the attention of constituencies toward 
those competence fields in which they could more “cheaply” establish themselves as competent.  
Ethnicity can be regarded as one such field and we provide an example of how it can be 
investigated with the help of an agent-based simulation model. A socio-historical context of inter-ethnic 
tensions, like the one of former Yugoslavia, provides a multitude of “ethnic clues” that can be easily “picked 
up” by prospective political leaders, in their attempts to establish a field where they could prove 
competence with minimal expenditure of resources. In times of crisis, difficulties in establishing competence 
in the fields of economic prosperity, social justice, and the like, increase the pressures on prospective 
leaders to “play the ethnic card”. 
While the first part of the article discusses mainly theoretical background and implications of the 
notion of competence fields, in section 6 we consider how this notion can be empirically grounded. We call 
for a combined application of both traditional social-scientific methods (interviews, discourse and contents 
analysis, participants observation), and the novel methods from the fields of information retrieval and 
computer modelling (natural language processing, social web and opinion mining, sentiment analysis, 
speech recognition, social network analysis, agent-based modelling and simulation), that have been 
enabled by the advances in computing technology. 
 
 
2. The notion of competence fields 
The classical approach to the relationship between political leaders and constituencies proceeds by way of 
the so-called median voter theorem, stating that on a scale from the left- to the right-wing political 
                                                     
2 We avoid the term “followers” because of its connotations of passivity. As we shall see shortly, “followers” are also agents in 
political processes, so we prefer “constituencies” as a term that better reflects the intrinsic agency of the “followers”. 
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opportunities, the most successful political agenda is the one preferred by the median voter (Downs, 1957), 
i.e. the voter who occupies the median position on the scale. Downs has shown that, in a two party system, 
a party that best represents the median voter will receive the majority of votes and win the election. Hence 
the median voter theorem predicts a tendency of political parties to move toward the middle of the political 
attitudes’ range. 
There are, however, certain limitations to the median voter theorem, such as the assumption of a 
one-dimensional, fixed preference scale. This limitation can be overcome with the notion of competence 
(Mueller, 1989). This notion assumes that prospective political leaders need be regarded as competent in 
order to convince a political audience of their leadership abilities (Mueller, 1989). For example, political 
actors offering competence in defence and security might be regarded as important by many people, while 
those offering competence in Voodoo activities might have problems to convince a sufficient number of 
followers (at least in the Western world). Competence is thus related to certain issues of public interest and 
there may be a multiplicity of competence fields. In particular, the concept of competence fields allows to 
overcome the assumption of a unimodal distribution over a one-dimensional scale. For instance, a political 
party might be perceived as highly competent with regard to economic issues but less competent with 
regard to security, or domestic issues and cultural politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Schematic representation of competence fields 
 
In Figure 1, the rectangle indicates the space of political problems and the circles indicate the 
competence of hypothetical parties in certain fields. Note that the graph illustrates competence as 
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perceived by a single actor. Such individual perceptions of competence need to be aggregated over the 
entire population.  
It is also important to note that competence is a constructivist concept: what is essential is 
perceived competence, and not some “objectively” measurable indicators. For instance, it might be 
reasonably questioned whether a policy of “law and order enforcement” is truly effective. Nevertheless, 
political actors may still be perceived as competent if they advocate harsh “law and order enforcement” 
measures.  
Perceived competence can be measured by votes. Thus, the notion of competence is related to the 
issue of legitimacy: if power is not based on pure coercion, political leaders or power structures need to be 
regarded as competent in order to gain legitimacy. Elections provide such legitimacy because the results 
can be regarded as evidence that the winner is perceived as the most competent candidate. At least two 
dimensions are involved in such a “proof”: first, what kind of agenda is generally seen as addressing the 
most urgent societal problems (e.g. economic progress, freedom, or equality). Second, what sort of agenda 
is perceived as the most efficient for solving these problems. However, the current crisis shows that political 
leaders are often no longer regarded as competent to solve societal problems.  
Perceived competence is always only relative with regard to other competitors. Presumably, 
grotesque election candidates advocating bizarre agendas and offering absurd promises do not gain votes 
because of their competence, but due to general loss of trust in the competence of their competitors; i.e. 
protest voting can be interpreted as a signal against other candidates rather than in favour of the candidate 
voted for (Neumann and Srbljinović, 2013a). 
Once constructed, competence fields become a sort of an “unregistered trademark” by which a 
political leader or a party can be widely recognisable. One can think of Mahatma Gandhi, for example, as 
being competent in politics of independence by non-violent means, or of Vaclav Havel as being competent 
in defence of human rights, or of Adolf Hitler as being “competent” in racism and anti-semitism. 
Competence fields are more “dynamic” than the median-voter approach since it is assumed that, 
with time, the agency of leaders can influence the attitudes of constituencies, and vice versa, the agency of 
constituencies can influence the attitudes of leaders. In other words, preferences of constituencies (and 
leaders) are not fixed, as assumed by the median voter theorem, but continually changing through a 
complex interplay of the agency of both leaders and constituencies. Leaders are trying to convince 
constituencies of the competence of the former, but the impression of competence is generally difficult to 
instill in times of crisis. Constituencies may rejoinder that leaders are not competent any more than 
constituencies themselves. Note that such a reply carries in itself the potential for the former members of 
constituencies to become future leaders. This is in contrast with classical models, such as the one 
assumed by the median voter theorem, where political actors passively mirror the preferences of the 
median voter and the median voter happily sees his or her preferences satisfied. Such models are 
inherently static and it is difficult to see how any sort of social change could occur under such conditions. 
 
 
3. Intersubjective construction of competence fields 
A claim to competence on the part of a political actor is a speech act (Austin, 1976) which is usually uttered 
in front of an audience. The aim of the political actor setting forth the claim is to convince the audience of 
his or her competence in a certain competence field (i.e. security, economy, social justice, etc.). Having in 
mind such an aim, the speaker usually backs up the claim with certain “strong reasons” (Boudon, 2001) 
expounding on why the audience should find the claim convincing. For example, the so-called 
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“securitisation moves” usually present some valuable material or immaterial object as being under serious 
threat in order to justify more or less extreme measures intended to protect the valuable object from the 
presumed danger (Buzan, 1995; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). 
It has been emphasised that contextual conditions affect the chances that a securitisation move will 
be successful. While in principle it remains open which topic will become the subject of a securitisation 
move, these moves are nevertheless not completely arbitrary (Williams, 2003; Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 
2008). The resonance of the audience depends on how the subject of the move is historically, institutionally 
or discursively “sedimented” (Williams, 2003). These contextual “sediments” are in large part 
consequences of past speech acts. 
All this holds for the claims to competence more generally. Indeed, the “strength” of strong reasons 
arises from the expectation “that the other man should feel and think in the same way” (Boudon, 2001, p. 
10), and this compelling feeling depends, in turn, on a shared socio-historical context3 within which the 
speaker and the audience have been situated. If the speaker and the audience share the same contextual 
“sediments”, the chances are greater that the speaker will strike “the right cord” within the audience and 
that the claim to competence and the concomitant strong reasons will be received with approval. 
The notions of competences and competence fields are “dynamic” since we assume that the 
distribution of perceptions of competences in any moment of time is the – always necessarily temporary – 
result of an ongoing struggle in which various political actors attempt to communicationally establish their 
competence in front of electoral audiences. Such attempts include not only proofs of competence in 
particular fields, but also struggles to draw public attention to certain fields of competence (e.g. economy, 
ethnicity, gender issues, abortion, etc.) in the first place. The attempts are always embedded in historical, 
institutional, discursive and other contextual “sediments”, which limit the total number of available options, 
but do not determine completely which option will prevail. In other words, there is still enough maneuvering 
space for actors’ agency. Hence, “[a] speech act is interesting exactly because it holds the insurrecting 
potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that is not already within the context – it reworks or 
produces a context by the performative success of the act” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, n. 5, p. 
46). 
However, since successful political leaders are those who are successful in convincing the 
audience of their competence, selection pressures from the social context toward certain kinds of shrewd 
political communication are to be expected. First, it is to be expected that prospective political leaders will 
attempt to draw public attention of the constituencies to those competence fields in which, under given 
contextual conditions, minimal costs are to be incurred by the leaders in order to establish themselves as 
competent in front of the constituencies. Second, it is to be expected that the agendas belonging to such 
competence fields incurring the least costs for the prospective leaders, will be advertised as “the most 
efficient” for solving all sorts of societal problems. For example, in a socio-historical context of high inter-
ethnic tensions, ethnicity will most probably present the field of competence in which prospective leaders 
could prove their competence with minimal expenditure of resources. Moreover, various ethnically 
motivated agendas will likely be advertised as “the most efficient” for solving all sorts of societal problems. 
As we shall elaborate in a short time, we expect selection pressures from the social context onto the 
prospective leaders to be particularly strong in times of crisis.  
 
                                                     
3 Following an explication of the meaning of “context” set forth by social psychologists, we assume that “[c]ontext is the general 
and continuing multilayered and interwoven set of material realities, social structures, patterns of social relations, and shared 
belief systems that surround any given situation” (Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004, p. 103). 
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4. Competence fields in times of crisis 
The instrumental logic used by electoral candidates in the attempts to convince constituencies to vote for 
them can be succinctly stated in the call: “Follow us and you will also be better off!” Such a call, however, 
may only be convincing in the context of relative economic prosperity, i.e. when the standard of living is on 
the rise, when large segments of the population become better off, and so on. Under the conditions of 
general prosperity, there are indeed strong reasons to regard leaders as competent enough to deserve 
their positions of leadership and the accompanying benefits. 
However, in times of economic crisis such instrumental arguments obviously lose their force – most 
of the people are not better off anymore. As resources become severely constrained, and as people 
increasingly become aware of limits on resources, as well as of dwindling opportunities to pursue their 
immediate interests, instrumental reasons lose credibility. It is to be expected that a greater weight will now 
be assigned to more axiologically oriented arguments, such as “the universalistic rule of merit”: “Those and 
only those who contribute more need to be more generously rewarded.”4 
It becomes, however, increasingly demanding for leaders to show that they indeed contribute 
more, i.e. to justify their competences in terms of the contribution to the general prosperity. As the whole 
economic system is crumbling, it looks like the leaders also contribute more to the crumbling. The context 
has changed, and those who could previously be regarded as contributing most to prosperity, now are seen 
as contributing most to the downturn. Those who could previously be perceived as legitimate leaders, now 
become increasingly perceived as mere “elites”, i.e. as some ones who do not really deserve their 
positions, but are occupying them due to other, less legitimate competences. This is what can be observed 
in many European countries affected by serious economic crisis. The competences of leaders become 
increasingly questionable. 
Leaders, faced with a dwindling budget and a threat to lose their established positions, struggle to 
retain what is now increasingly regarded as their “privileges”. The old call to constituencies to follow the 
current leaders in order to prosper cannot be any longer proclaimed in a self-assured “Trust me, I know 
what I’m doing!”-style.5 As axiological arguments become increasingly popular among the constituencies, 
leaders now also have a stronger incentive to demonstrate their competence in the axiological domain, 
which is not easily reconcilable with the need to preserve their acquired benefits. Leaders may therefore 
become increasingly tempted to “cheat”, i.e. to pretend they pursue universal values while, in fact, seeking 
to further their self-interest. In other words, leaders may become tempted to feign axiological rationality in 
order to preserve their positions. 
                                                     
4 According to Boudon, and following Weber, rationality can be instrumental, as when people aim to choose the best means to 
satisfy a given goal, typically maximisation of one’s interest, or axiological, when people behave “in a way congruent with 
principles they consider worth following” (Boudon, 2001, p. 42). Both types of rationality can be subsumed under what Boudon 
calls the “cognitivist model”, according to which social actors should be considered rational as long as “they have strong reasons 
for believing what they believe, for doing what they do, etc.” (Boudon, 2001, p. 67). These “strong reasons” can be derived from 
cost/benefit considerations of various courses of action, in which case the cognitivist model reduces to instrumental rationality as 
its special case, or they can be derived from the actor’s conviction that some course of action is good, fair, legitimate or in some 
other way “valuable”, in which case the model yields axiological rationality as its special case. 
5 It is possible for leaders to argue, in a somewhat messianic tone, that they are, in fact, ingenious, but the uneducated public is, 
unfortunately, not up to the task of recognising their great deeds. However, this strategy is unlikely to be perceived as grounded 
in strong reasons and therefore unlikely to receive wider support. 
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Following Risse’s (2000) distinction between the logic of consequences, the logic of 
appropriateness, and the logic of arguing,6 we have posited certain types of logic to be more prominent in 
certain contexts than others (Neumann and Srbljinović, 2013b). In other words, we have assumed that 
actors’ selection of a certain kind of “logical frame” is triggered by dynamically changing contextual 
conditions. This enabled us to hypothesise prevalence of certain types of logic in the contexts of economic 
prosperity and crisis, respectively (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Hypotheses about prevalent types of logic among leaders/constituencies in times of well-being/crisis 
 
 Leaders Constituencies 
Well-being Logic of appropriateness Logic of appropriateness 
Crisis Logic of consequences with admixtures of logic of 
arguing (rhetorical action, strategic uses of argument) 
Logic of arguing 
 
 
In times of well-being we expect the logic of appropriateness to carry greatest significance among 
both leaders and constituencies. As the interests of everyone are satisfied at least to some extent, it is 
easily taken for granted that following leaders makes everyone better off. When the tide is rising and the 
wind is good, there is no need, for most people, to rock the boat. This is not to say that arguments based 
on instrumental or axiological premises will be entirely missing from public discussions in times of well-
being, only that many, and perhaps, most people would not feel a compelling need to enter such 
discussions, being satisfied with things as they are. In fact, as both sides adhere to the logic of 
appropriateness, even asymmetries between leaders and constituencies may not be readily apparent as 
other cleavages may be more salient. 
As times become harder, however, people can be expected to become more attentive to a more 
“activist” logic. It is our contention that for constituencies it would be the logic of arguing, while for leaders it 
would be the logic of consequences with some admixtures of the logic of arguing.  
Constituencies, on one hand, become increasingly aware that following leaders does not bring 
much good any more. On the other hand, however, they are not powerful enough to adopt the logic of 
consequences and engage in direct strategic bargaining with leaders. In other words, average citizens are 
not powerful enough to articulate their own interests as “strong reasons”. Moreover, at least some among 
them may become genuinely aware that available resources are limited to such an extent that the 
insistence on one's self-interest is simply pointless. Taking all these circumstances into account, the logic of 
arguing appears to be contextually most acceptable to constituencies. 
                                                     
6 Risse has, in fact, refined an older distinction between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness, proposed by 
March and Olsen (1989, 1998). In terms of the earlier discussion of Boudon’s “cognitivist model” and “strong reasons”, it can be 
said that the logic of consequences searches for strong reasons of an act or a belief primarily at its consequences for an actor or 
a believer, while the logic of arguing seeks “a reasoned consensus” (Risse, 2000, p. 9) among actors, based on mutual 
understanding rather than on self-centered calculations of success (Habermas, 1981). This corresponds to Boudon’s axiological 
rationality. The logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, does not care much about reasons. Therefore, according to the 
“cognitivist model”, action taken under a dominant influence of the logic of appropriateness could not be regarded as rational 
action. In terms of Weber’s (1922 [1978]) typology of action types, it can be denoted as traditional action. 
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Leaders, confronted with a threat to their privileged positions, have incentives to use their positions 
of power and try to openly impose their interests in direct bargaining with constituencies. This is a strategy 
to restrict access to power and privilege to save the surplus for themselves. However, this entails significant 
risks of provoking the constituencies to resort to more drastic means of opposition, including revolutionary 
violence. In fact, though great uncertainty in the data has to be admitted, it has been found in empirical 
studies of civil war that the exclusion of major parts of the society from access to power increases the 
likelihood of violence (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). Therefore, pure logic of consequences seems 
to be an overly crude instrument to be used on the part of leaders. 
Faced with growing axiologically rooted demands of constituencies, leaders are more likely to 
engage in what Risse (2000, p. 8, following Schimmelfennig, 1997) calls “rhetorical action”, or what Elster 
(1995) calls “strategic uses of argument”. Both terms imply that the actual logic employed lies somewhere 
in between the logic of consequences and the logic of arguing. The point is that arguing is not used by 
leaders as a means of arriving at a reasoned consensus, but primarily as a means of furthering self-
interest. Self-interest is rhetorically presented as general interest, i.e. instrumental rationality is feigned as 
axiological. 
Elster (1995, p. 246), providing an example of a strategic use of argument, speaks of a well-off 
advocate who breaks taxes for the well-off, and only for them, and supports such a decision with a 
universalist-style argument that this policy will have beneficial effects for all by a trickle-down effect. 
However, such a move has minimal chances to withstand counter-arguments, supposedly being raised by 
the logic of arguing, pointing to other possible policies that would have more direct beneficial effects for all, 
such as breaking taxes for all, without exceptions. In other words, as soon as impartial arguments are 
invoked, even if only rhetorically, it nevertheless becomes increasingly demanding to foist off partial 
interests under the guise of impartiality.7 
Note also that the advocate’s proposal to break taxes for most, but not all, who are well-off, and for 
some of the worse-off as well, might be generally more acceptable than reducing taxes for the well-off only. 
Elster’s general point is that strategic arguments that deviate enough from the self-interest of the 
proponent, but not so much that nothing is gained, have better chances to become accepted than allegedly 
impartial arguments that fit too well with one’s self-interest. We can only add that when power differentials 
are significant, as in the case of leaders vs. constituencies, it becomes even easier for the more powerful 
side to perform various rhetorical manoeuvres under the guise of impartiality. The possible spectrum of 
strategic manoeuvres is very large, as there are numerous possible fields of competence and the leaders 
may in any time attempt to divert public attention from discussions of their competences to contribute to the 
general prosperity toward some other fields (e.g. ethnicity, abortion, same-sex marriage, etc.), in which 
competence claims can be more easily, i.e. “less costly”, established within the given context. 
 
 
5. Example: Ethnicity as Competence Field 
A simulation model has been developed to study dynamics of nationalist radicalisation. Model assumptions 
have been based on the empirical evidence of historical narratives of the much studied case of the former 
Yugoslavia (e.g. Bringa, 1995; Woodward, 1995; Silber and Little, 1997; Melcic, 1999; Wilmer, 2002; 
                                                     
7 Elster (1995, p. 257, emphasis in original) refers to “a multiplier effect of impartiality, by which the presence of some genuinely 
impartial actors may force or induce self-interested others to behave as if they, too, were swayed by such motives”. This 
becomes possible since even one’s rhetorical commitment to values opens the way for other (perhaps truly committed) actors to 
hold this actor accountable for complying to the proclaimed values (Neumann and Srbljinović, 2013c). 
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Gagnon, 2004; Sieber-Egger, 2011). The starting point of the conflict has been described as power struggle 
within the Yugoslavian Communist Party. Formerly communist politicians took advantage of ethnic 
sentiments, allowing them to command loyalty with the ethnic agenda. Nevertheless, the degree of ethnic 
mobilisation in the population initially remained small (Calic, 1995). However, very soon civilians were also 
becoming involved in the battles and even war crimes. Thus the empirical evidence suggests a theoretical 
mechanism of a recursive feedback relation between dynamics on the political level and socio-cultural 
dynamics at the population level as described in the previous sections. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Relation between political actors and political attitudes 
  
 
The model is publicly available in the OpenABM archive: 
http://www.openabm.org/model/4048/version/1/view . For a detailed description of the model see Markisic, 
Neumann and Lotzmann (2012). The model assumptions target the change of neighbourhood relations. 
The empirical evidence suggested a two-level design of the model, namely to specify the mechanisms of 
the escalation dynamics of ethno-political conflicts as a recursive feedback between political actors and 
social identities at the population level. While a focus purely on the population level (e.g. Horowitz, 2001) 
masks the responsibility of political actors, explanations that focus purely on the political level (e.g. Gagnon, 
2004) need to explain why certain politics had been successful. Integrating both accounts generates a self-
organised feedback cycle between political actors and attitudes. The basic mechanism is the reinforcement 
of the population’s value orientations through the agency of political actors. These orientations may 
generally be related to either civil values or national identities. On the one hand, politicians mobilise value 
orientations in the population to get public support. On the other hand, politicians appeal to the most 
popular value orientations in order to maximise the support. In abstract terms, the feedback relation can be 
described as a recursive function. Hence there is a positive feedback cycle, damped, however, by the fact 
that various politicians compete over different value orientations in the population. The model is calibrated 
at the population census of 1991 in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas Serbia and Croatia 
had rather homogeneous populations, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was highly ethnically mixed.  
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Figure 3. 
Use case diagram of the model structure (adapted from Funke, 2012) 
  
 
Simulation experiments have been undertaken with the assumption of complete ignorance about 
the empirical distribution of cognitive components, namely of the political attitudes of citizens and the 
political agendas of politicians. Initially both the political agendas and the value orientations of citizens are 
set randomly for all republics. This allows studying the pure effect of the feedback cycle. 
Differences in simulation results are due to differential population distributions since all other 
features are the same for all republics. For the sake of simplicity of the argument, we concentrate on the 
change in value orientations of the population. This reflects the research question of how neighbourhood 
relations changed in the course of conflict escalation. In fact, all republics reach the stage of nationalist 
radicalisation during the simulation. However, dynamics reveals a crucial difference: while the simulated 
homogeneous population quickly becomes radicalised (figure 4), in heterogeneous populations 
radicalisation is slower. Only in the second half of the simulation a push towards nationalist radicalisation 
can be observed (Figure 5).  
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Figure 4. 
 Example of average value distribution in an ethnically homogeneous population 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  
Example of average value distribution in an ethnically heterogeneous population 
  
 
Simulation reveals two stylised facts of the two basic general mechanisms of escalation dynamics. 
These stylised facts reveal the mechanisms which connect the explanans and the explanandum. The first 
mechanism concerns political processes, the second mechanisms concerns micro processes of 
neighbourhood relations. The inter-penetration of the processes reveals sequential ordering: 
First, on the political level, visibility of political appeals plays the essential role for radicalisation, by 
stimulating counter-radicalisation in response to initial radicalisation. This is driven by the political level and 
accounts for the case of rather homogeneous populations and nations with common or closely related 
historical heritage such as Serbia and Croatia. Ethnically mixed populations, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
provide more resistance against political radicalisation prior to the outbreak of actual violence. Political 
radicalisation can be achieved more easily in ethnically homogeneous nations. 
Second, refugees and rumours play the essential role for later radicalisation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Here, radicalisation is imported from outside and is driven predominantly by the population 
level. Dense networks increase the likelihood of the spreading of radicalisation. 
In sum, the result is that more homogeneous populations were more likely to be subjected to 
radicalisation than heterogeneous ones. The mechanism is political radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation, enfolding a positive feedback cycle. Ethnicity is a possible competence field in which political 
actors might become successful. Heterogeneous societies, in contrast, have more damping mechanisms to 
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prevent radicalisation. The attractiveness of ethnicity as competence field in heterogeneous societies is 
restricted to only minorities. With regard to the attractiveness to a wider audience, other competence fields 
seem to be more promising. It should be noted that these are theoretical results, not an explanation of any 
empirical case: much more factors come into play in reality. For instance, neither economic history nor 
Yugoslavia’s communist legacy has been taken into account. Likewise the random initialisation of political 
attitudes is only a thought experiment. However, this focus on the theoretical investigation of social 
mechanisms (while model assumptions are based on qualitative empirical evidence) allows for a 
generalisation of the insights gained by the simulation experiments: the model provides an example of how 
the concept of competence fields can be utilised for applied research.  
If there is a lesson for Europe, which is to be learned from the case of former Yugoslavia, it seems 
to be that focusing political struggles on inter-ethnic/international tensions in times of crisis can bring into 
question the very foundations of the larger supranational union of which these individual, relatively 
homogeneous ethnicities/nations are parts. In Europe the states constituting the Union are also constituted 
as nation-states, which provides an incentive for political entrepreneurs to appeal to the constitutional 
foundation of the nation. In other words, the “natural move” from the competence fields such as economic 
prosperity, social justice, democratic reforms of the supranational union, and the like  – which are, 
admittedly, in times of crisis difficult and “unrewarding” for political leaders – toward the competence field of 
ethnicity/nationalism, can undermine the very foundations of the larger union.  
 
 
1. How to investigate competence fields 
It should be apparent from what has already been said that competence fields are multifaceted, 
dynamic phenomena. Like all political maneuvering, competence fields are always in flux, always changing 
contours, being shaped and reshaped by multiple speech acts “reworking and producing” contextual 
conditions that enable those speech acts to be uttered. 
Such multifaceted, dynamic phenomena can best be investigated by a combined application of 
methods that are traditionally used in humanities and social sciences, as well as the novel methods that 
have more recently been enabled by the development of computing technology. 
Processes of formation and development of competence fields can be investigated by more 
traditional social-scientific methods. Since the role of speech seems to be crucial for establishment of 
competence fields, qualitative methods seem to be particularly suited for investigating discursive aspects of 
the processes involved. Speeches of various political actors can be analysed by discourse analysis. 
Politicians can be interviewed so as to gain insights into their way of reasoning, “the logic” they are driven 
by, as well as their use of arguments (“rhetorical action”, “strategic use of arguments”, etc.). In particular, 
the hypotheses outlined in table 1 could be tested. 
Various additional, more or less automated methods and techniques from the field of information 
retrieval including but not limited to natural language processing, social web & opinion mining, sentiment 
analysis, speech recognition can be used to provide further empirical evidence for competence fields and 
for testing hypotheses. Various sources available on social media that frequently contain digital speech 
acts of politicians (in form of text, audio and video material) but also user discussions, comments and most 
importantly opinions about them could be collected, analysed and used to produce statistical data about 
current public perceptions of competence.  
Of special interest are news portals and specialised weblogs which often include interviews and 
reports on political events and even more often allow visitors to comment on these articles. The actual 
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articles (including potential audio and video material) could be used to automatically or semi-automatically 
construct competence fields in form of topic maps (see Ponjavić et al. 2010 for an example), tag clouds 
(Smith 2008), conceptual networks (Schatten 2013), or even folksonomies (Mika 2007). These conceptual 
maps which identify most important topics in a given series of texts, could be used to visualise the space of 
political problems (if applied to a statistically relevant collection of articles that contain speech acts) or the 
space of political problems as perceived by one political actor (a politician, a party, an interest group etc., if 
applied only on selected articles which cover these political actors).  
These conceptual maps could then be further analysed to yield actual fields of competence as 
perceived by the readers of a given news outlet if compared with the given comments. Sentiment analysis 
or opinion mining which refers to the application of natural language processing, computational linguistics, 
and text analytics to identify and extract subjective information in source materials (Pang and Lee 2008) 
provides us with the necessary methodology to automatically extract how people feel about the 
competence as perceived by given political actor. In this way, the conceptual maps could be annotated with 
actual sentiment about competence as given by actual readers yielding therefore an empirical view of 
competence fields based on statistical analysis. 
Besides speech as one key dimension, dynamism of competence fields, as another crucial facet,8 
can also be productively investigated by a combination of the more and the less traditional methods. When 
considering dynamics of competence field formation, it must be stressed that this dynamics can be 
observed at several levels of social aggregation: the interpersonal, the inter-group (e.g. inter-ethnic, inter-
party, inter-associational, etc.), the inter-spheral (e.g. public-to-political sphere dynamics and vice versa, 
political-to-economic sphere dynamics and vice versa, economic-to-public sphere dynamics and vice 
versa),9 and the inter-societal (i.e. supranational) level.  
On the other hand information retrieval methods could apply here as well. For example, the 
previously mentioned competence fields could be analysed for their dynamics by adding a temporal 
perspective to topic maps. In this way one could animate the changes that occur in the perceived space of 
political problems, as well as the perceived competence fields of political actors. These analyses could be 
further detailed by analysing actors on various levels of detail (for example party, club, group, individual 
politician), based on geographical region, or even based on various traits of the actual public actors whose 
comments were analysed to provide the competence fields. Such temporal analytics would not only be 
valuable to science as an empirical source of knowledge, but could also find their way into the practice of 
political campaign monitoring and trend analysis. 
More traditional methods, such as participant observation, can be used for tracing, for example, 
how certain ideas through interpersonal or inter-group contacts, micro-mechanisms of social influence, etc. 
get transferred from the civil society (public sphere) to the political arena. Research results thus obtained 
can, however, be used as (partial, at least) inputs into less traditional, and more technologically advanced 
analyses, such as social network analysis and agent-based simulation, by means of which those results 
can be incorporated into more comprehensive or more generalizable models and schemes.10 
                                                     
8 It can be argued, of course, that speech itself is a dynamic phenomenon. 
9  Cohen and Arato (1992) advance the thesis that a thorough interpenetration among the three mentioned spheres is a 
fundamental precondition of a viable society. 
10 In order to emphasise the agency (and not only the structural) dimension that can also be tackled with those approaches, 
Saunders-Newton (2006) subsumes various methodological approaches of sociophysics, multi-agent modelling, and social 
network analysis under the notion of agency-based modelling. He also calls for “a maturing transdiscipline that allows analysts 
and inquirers not only to consider increasingly complex phenomenology in a rigorous fashion, but also to pursue such inquiry in a 
more interdisciplinary fashion” (Saunders-Newton, 2006, p. 167). 
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Recent advances in network science allow us to model the dynamics of rumor spread across social 
networks (Doerr et al., 2012). Similar models could be applied to analyze how political problems and ideas 
are transferred from the political arena to the public, vice versa and internally inside both of these entities. 
Here again information retrieval techniques could be employed to collect data about social networks on one 
hand and actual ideas (concepts) on the other. Depending on the social systems to be analysed, networks 
could be found in various social applications (forums, weblogs, social networking sites, wikis, podcasting, 
etc.) as well as by analysing news content (e.g. if various political actors are mentioned in the same article 
about some event that could imply that they are socially connected), official sites (party/interest group/lobby 
member lists could provide us with social network data), official communication (sender and receiver of 
communication are actors in a communication network), etc. Actual ideas that spread through a network 
could be collected through mining techniques from news and media as explained above. 
Agent-based simulation techniques could then be employed to create models based on empirical 
data in order to provide new theories about the dynamics of competence fields and of course yield 
prediction methods.  
Another research question that comes to mind is the question of a link between competence fields 
and conspiracy theories. Whatever the way we look at conspiracy theories, either as particular, intentionally 
exploited, ideological constructs, or as a reasonable attempt to comprehend and position oneself in the 
increasingly complex and incomprehensible world (Blanuša, 2013), the question remains whether 
conspiracy theories can also be used as tools in struggles to establish competence fields, if anything, as a 
way to justify one’s own only partial competence, or even complete incompetence, in certain, allegedly 
conspiracy-driven, fields. 
 
 
2. Conclusion 
We have offered a conceptualisation of competence fields as a means of establishing political leadership. 
We have argued that competence fields are socially constructed, and elucidated their construction by 
recourse to well-established theoretical frameworks, such as Boudon’s, Buzan’s, Risse’s and Elster’s. 
These frameworks have already been subjected to thorough theoretical discussions and elaborations. 
However, for most of them, empirical implications have not been, as yet, so carefully worked out. 
Hence, the aim of our further research will be to make the notion of competence fields more 
concrete by identifying its empirical correlates. Such research agenda calls for a combined application of 
traditional social-scientific methods and various additional, more or less automated methods and 
techniques from the field of information retrieval and computer modelling. We have already offered a 
glimpse into such research by the example of an agent-based model of ethnicity as competence field which 
allows identifying mechanisms that drive social dynamics. Further results that will be obtained in synergy 
between the often complementary social-scientific and computational approaches could significantly 
improve our understanding of the emergence, development, and dissolution of competence fields, and 
provide sound empirical support to the conceptualisation of competence fields as a means of establishing 
political leadership. 
Democracy is the bedrock of inclusive, innovative and reflective societies, while free speech and 
argumentative exchanges among citizens as moral and political equals are fundamental for democracy. In 
this spirit, by probing deeply into discursive processes of competence fields formation, this research should 
not only contribute to a better scientific understanding of political communication and political leadership, 
but also to the development of a more democratic, inclusive, innovative and reflective society. 
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